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ACL UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS AND STANDARD CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
CHINELLE VAN DER WESTHUIZEN* AND PHIL EVANS**
ABSTRACT
The unfair contract terms (UCT) provisions in the Australian Consumer Law (ACL) have radically
affected the common law rights and obligations of parties using ‘standard form’ contracts in Australia.
The provisions could be described as the most significant reform to the consumer law framework in
Australia since the introduction of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA). The provisions now apply
to both consumer and small business contracts. With respect to UCTs, where a court finds that terms in
standard contracts are ‘unfair’, it may refuse to enforce all or any of the terms of a contract or
arrangement. Standard form contracts are widely used in the building and construction industry and a
number of terms appear to be inconsistent with the ACL provisions. This article considers the common
law doctrine of unconscionability with respect to UCT clauses, the development of UCT legislation and
the application of UCT legislation to typical construction industry contracts.

I INTRODUCTION
Historically common law emphasised the sanctity of contract. This was traditionally known as
‘pacta sunt servanda’.1 It was the basis of the principle known as ‘freedom of contract’ which
was the central theme of 19th century mercantile dealings promoted by the advocates of ‘laissezfaire’.2 The phrase describes a system or approach that opposes any regulation or interference
by the government in economic affairs beyond the minimum necessary to allow the free
enterprise system to operate according to individualism and economic freedom. Nevertheless,
under common law (and prior to any legislative intervention) equity has intervened and parties
are not really free to contract as they wish. The common law has long recognised factors which
would vitiate a contract. These are incapacity, illegality, mistake, misrepresentation, duress,
undue influence and later unconscionable conduct. The central theme in each of these causes
of action, which may give rise to the vitiation of a contract, is essentially lack of consent
described historically as ‘consensus ad idem’.3 In contract law it means there must be a general
‘meeting of the minds’ of all parties involved and everyone involved has accepted the offered
contractual obligations of each party to the agreement. This is the first principle of enforceable
contracts. However, the concept of a contract being held to be harsh or unfair where there was
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no evidence of the absence of free consent was difficult to reconcile with the competing
principles of freedom to contract or sanctity of contract.
Consequently, where a contract is based on mutual agreement and free choice, and once
agreement has been reached, the parties will be held to their word. No matter how harsh the
terms of a contract were, the parties, particularly commercial parties bargaining at arm’s length,
would be bound by the agreement. That principle was well established at common law. In
Printing and Numerical Registering Company v Sampson4 it was stated:5
If there is one thing which more than another public policy requires, it is that men of
full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and
that their contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held sacred and
shall be enforced by Courts of Justice.

In more contemporary times this principle was applied in a construction law context in the case
of South Australian Railways Commissioner v Egan.6 The facts are briefly that Egan had
contracted to build a number of railway bridges and culverts for the South Australian Railways.
A term of the contract provided that if work did not proceed to the satisfaction of the Chief
Engineer or if Egan failed to carry out any of its terms, the Commissioner could terminate it.
In that event, any money then owed to Egan would be ‘forfeited’ as would his plant and
equipment that he was using on the project. The Commissioner in exercising this power,
terminated the contract and Egan’s plant and equipment on site were forfeited. Egan disputed
the Commissioner’s power and commenced litigation. He was unsuccessful.
It was clear from the judgement that harshness by itself was not considered to be an invalidating
factor no matter how much the court would have liked it to be. As Menzies J stated:7
This appeal is concerned with perhaps the most wordy, obscure and oppressive contract
that I have come across. It is the standard form of contract which the South Australian
Railways Commissioner requires those executing railway works for him to sign….The
contract is so outrageous that it is surprising that any contractor would undertake work
for the Railways Commissioner upon its terms. It is, of course, a contract to which the
doctrine of contra proferentem applies. The employment of such a contract tempts
judges to go outside their function and attempt to relieve against the harshness of, rather
than give effect to, what has been agreed by the parties. Courts search for justice but it
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is justice according to law; it is still true that hard cases tend to make bad law.

Menzies J further noted that he was bound by the law and the contract must stand. Therefore,
‘harshness’ is not a characteristic the court will consider when determining whether to set aside
the contract due to unfairness.
II SETTING ASIDE CONTRACTS UNDER COMMON LAW
While the principle of freedom of contract was still paramount, the common law provided for
the setting aside of agreements as noted above where a party entered into a contract on the basis
of misrepresentation, undue influence, duress, mistake or unconscionable conduct. Courts were
thus able to provide some protection for weaker parties from the consequences of unfair or
harsh contract terms. However, the protections were limited and constrained by the necessity
to prove each of the elements which constituted ‘unfairness’ with respect to the relevant cause
of action. As a result, the court focused on the issue of consensus and whilst it could set aside
the agreement in total there was no power to delete any unfair terms in the agreement. Although
the authors appreciate the significance of the aforementioned common law rights, this article
will focus on the unconscionable doctrine.
A subsequent advance was the extension of issues dealing exclusively with ‘consent’ to develop
a common law doctrine of unconscionability, based upon basic concepts of justice and fairness
by attempting to prevent the taking of advantage of a ‘weaker’ party by a ‘stronger’ party in
circumstances deemed ‘unconscionable’.8 However, the doctrine initially was somewhat
constrained. In Bridge v Campbell Discount Co Ltd,9 Lord Radcliffe stated:
Unconscionability must not be taken as a panacea for adjusting any contract between
competent persons…Since the courts of equity never undertook to serve as a general
adjuster of men’s bargains…I am not certain that it would be a desirable achievement
to try to reconcile all the rules under some simple general formula.

Furthermore, in Lloyds Bank Ltd v Bundy10 Lord Denning, consistent with his concerns for
general justice and fairness, suggested that it was possible to find a common theme or general
doctrine of unconscionability:
By virtue of it, the English law gives relief to one who without independent advice
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enters into a contract upon terms which are very unfair or transfers his property for
consideration which is grossly inadequate, when his bargaining power is grievously
impaired by reason of his own needs and desires, or by his ignorance and infirmity,
coupled with undue influence or pressures brought to bear on him by or for the benefit
of the other…..Again I do not mean to suggest that every transaction is saved by
independent advice. But the absence of it may be fatal, with these explanations; I hope
this principle will be found to reconcile the cases.

In the Australian jurisdiction this first manifested in the definitive case of the Commonwealth
Bank of Australia Ltd v Amadio.11 In Amadio, the court set aside a mortgage and bank guarantee
given by elderly Italian immigrants in favour of the bank to secure an overdraft facility to be
granted to their son’s building company. At the time of the execution of the documents, the
Amadios were misled by the bank into believing that their liability was limited to $50,000 and
for a period of six months. The son’s company subsequently failed and the bank made demands
on the guarantees. The Amadios then sought to have the mortgage and guarantee set aside. They
were successful.
The decision was based on a number of factors. The bank had deliberately misled the Amadios
regarding the terms of the guarantee; they had traditionally relied on their son for advice; they
were elderly with limited business acumen and poor English language skills and there was an
absence of any independent legal advice. At the same time the doctrine was not unfettered. In
the decision, Deane J listed the essential factors necessary to establish a successful plea based
on unconscionability. These include:12
(i) A party to a transaction was under a special disability in dealing with the other
party with the consequence that there was an absence of any reasonable degree of
equality between them and
(ii) That disability was sufficiently evident to the stronger party to make it prima facie
unfair or 'unconscientious' that he procure, or accept, the weaker party's assent to
the impugned transaction in the circumstances in which he procured or accepted it

Where such circumstances are shown to have existed, an onus is cast upon the stronger party to
show that the transaction was fair, just and reasonable.
The issue of a special disability or special disadvantage is determined by considering the
relationship between the parties and assessing whether the weaker party’s capacity to make a
decision in their best interest was significantly (and detrimentally) influenced by the stronger
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party. However, in order to argue a special disadvantage, the decision that is taken by the parties
to enter into the contract must affect the judgement of the parties in such a way that it creates a
situation where parties do not act in their own best interest.13 In this respect, Mason J held that
‘because times have changed, new situations have arisen in which it may be appropriate to
invoke the underlying principle’.14 As a result, subsequent decisions have held that special
disability or disadvantage can arise through ignorance and trust on belief of the weaker party15
or even infatuation or severe emotional dependence.16
As can be seen from the above discussion, under common law there are a number of issues with
respect to unconscionable conduct claims. Firstly, the doctrine of unconscionable conduct
exclusively relates to the facts and conduct of the stronger party at the time of entering into the
contract. Next as noted by Deane J, in Amadio, the burden of proof lies with the person affected
by the conduct to establish the essential factors necessary to establish a successful
unconscionable conduct claim. Further, in addition to the time and cost involved in private
litigation, the principal remedy available to the court is the setting aside of the agreement in
total and the court had no power to strike out any ‘unfair’ terms. The capricious application of
the equitable doctrine of unconscionability contributed to the adoption of a statutory form of
unconscionability.17 This statutory form was positively received especially under the TPA and
newly adopted ACL regime, which is beneficial for small businesses in the construction
industry, as will be discussed below.
III SETTING ASIDE CONTRACTS UNDER STATUTE
As mentioned above, the freedom of contract is not unfettered. It is a freedom set within limits
dictated by parliament which provides protections to vulnerable parties in order to prevent
abuse. Consequently, in addition to the expansion of the common law ability to set aside
bargains which have not been freely entered into, there have been a number of statutory
developments relating to unconscionable conduct since the Amadio case. In particular the
former Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth),18 expanded with the introduction of the Australian
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Consumer Law (ACL),19 the Contracts Review Act 1987 (NSW),20 the various state Fair
Trading Acts,21 legislation dealing with domestic building contracts22 and provisions dealing
with financial services.23
It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the respective legislation referred to, suffice to
say that whilst the statutory remedies permit agreements created unconscionably to be set aside,
and in some cases the award of damages, they do not permit a court to prohibit or delete ‘unfair’
terms in a contract. It is only through the intervention of the ACL that the UCT regime is now
applicable to set aside a contract due to UCT provisions in a contract. This, as noted, is a
significant step to protecting not only individuals, but also small businesses (particularly those
in the construction industry) who enter into standard form contracts and do not have the
necessary safeguards under the statutory unconscionable provisions. As noted by Coggins in
relation to the application of the UCT regime within the construction industry:24
The pyramidal contracting structure, and imbalance in bargaining power between head
contractors and subcontractors, in the Australian construction industry produces
contract terms that may be considered onerous to the point of being unfair.

Therefore, the aim of this article is to consider the imbalance of rights and obligations between
construction contracting parties within the ambit of the ACL provisions as a result of unfair
contracting terms between these parties. In order to achieve this aim, it is necessary to first
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address the origins of the UCT provisions in standard form consumer contracts before
expanding on its application towards small businesses in the construction industry.
IV UCT IN STANDARD CONSUMER CONTRACTS AND THE ACL
The traditional unconscionable conduct legislative provisions have not been satisfactory with
respect to preventing the use of UCT in both consumer and small business contracts. As a result,
the Australian Government Productivity Commission noted in 2008 in its Review of Australia’s
Consumer Policy Framework25 that there were a number of difficulties in using the existing
unconscionable provisions of the TPA to prevent the use of unfair terms in consumer standard
form contracts.26

In part, these included the length of time and costs in applying the

unconscionable conduct provisions in the TPA27 and further actions under the unconscionable
provisions of the TPA did not provide the court with the ability to strike out UCT provisions.
Consequently, in 2010, the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No
1) 2010 (Cth) introduced UCT provisions into the nationalised TPA focusing on standard form
contracts.28 These provisions became effective on 1 July 2010. Subsequently the Trade
Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No 2) 2010 (Cth), which became
effective on 1 January 2011, incorporated the UCT provisions within the ACL.29 This was a
significant step towards protecting contracting parties based on the moral and economic reasons
attached to statutory UCT.30 The national unfair contract regime, under the ACL, provides that
a court may determine that a term of a standard form consumer contract is unfair and therefore
void as an alternative claim to unconscionability.31 Traditionally, the unfair contract term
provisions primarily dealt with ‘consumer contracts’; however, the provisions were
subsequently extended to small businesses (as will be discussed under Part V).
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A Consumer Contract Classification
In line with the purpose of s 23(1) of the ACL, a ‘consumer contract’ shall be identified as a
contract for the (a) supply of goods and services or (b) the sale or grant of an interest in land,
to an individual who acquires it wholly or predominately for personal, domestic or household
use or consumption.32 While these provisions are expanded under s 23(3), the test for
identifying a ‘consumer contract’ is still very much a subjective one. However, the core
examination of this section is the ‘acquisition’ of goods or services by a small business defined
under the ACL.
B Standard Form Contracts
The term ‘standard form contract’ is not defined under the ACL. However, a ‘standard form
contract’ can be characterised where one party has the bargaining power in negotiations and is
made on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.33 These may also be described as ‘adherence’ contracts and
the analogy being that the contract terms ‘stick’ to the weaker party who is requesting the goods
or services on a ‘take it or leave it basis’ and not having the opportunity to negotiate terms that
would be fair, equitable and practical.34 However, guidance on how to interpret a standard form
contract can be found in the extensive list of factors set out under s 27(2) of the ACL Which
provides the following factors to be taken into account;
‘(a) whether one of the parties has all or most of the bargaining power relating to the
transaction;
(b) whether the contract was prepared by one party before any discussion relating to
the transaction occurred between the parties;
(c) whether another party was, in effect, required either to accept or reject the terms of
the contract (other than the terms referred to in section 26(1)) in the form in which they
were presented;
(d) whether another party was given an effective opportunity to negotiate the terms of
the contract that were not the terms referred to in section 26(1);
(e) whether the terms of the contract (other than the terms referred to in section 26(1))
take into account the specific characteristics of another party or the particular
32
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transaction;
(f) any other matter prescribed by the regulations.’

Although the court is given statutory guidance on whether a contract is a ‘standard form
contract’, s 27(1) provides a rebuttable presumption that if a party to a contract alleges that the
contract is a standard form contract, it is presumed to be such. Therefore, evidence needs to be
provided to the contrary in order to escape application of the UCT regime. It is noted by
Giancaspro that; ‘Whilst standard form contracts are beneﬁcial in many ways, they are clearly
capable of being engineered in an excessively unbalanced manner’.35 Therefore, it is the
purpose of the UCT provisions to cover unfair standard form contracts through a variety of
circumstances as outlined below.
C Meaning of Unfair under the UCT Provisions
The test applied to determine whether a term is unfair under the ACL, is set out under s 24(1)
and provides essentially that a term of a standard form ‘consumer contract’ will be unfair if:
(i) it would cause a significant imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under
the contract;
(ii) it is not reasonably necessary in order to protect the legitimate interest of the party
who would be advantaged by the term to the contract (note that the party who
would be advantaged by the term must prove that it is reasonably necessary); and
(iii) it would cause detriment to a party to the contract if it were to be applied or relied
upon. [own emphasis added]

For section 24(1) to apply, all three features of the test must be established and proved in order
for a court to find that a term is unfair. A further consideration for the court is to take into
account the extent to which the term is transparent, and the contract as a whole.36 Section 25(a)(n) provides an extensive but not exclusive list of the types of terms that may be considered
unfair.37 However, terms that set the upfront price and subject matter of a contract, and terms

Mark Giancaspro, ‘Unfair Contract Terms and Small Business Contracts: Insights from Australian
Competition and Consumer Commission v JJ Richards & Sons Pty Ltd and the Case for Small Business
Protection’ (2018) 26 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 25, 26.
36
Ibid s 24(2)(a).
37
Examples under Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sch 2 s 25 include: ‘(a) a term that permits, or has
the effect of permitting, one party (but not another party) to avoid or limit performance of the contract; (b) a term
that permits, or has the effect of permitting, one party (but not another party) to terminate the contract; (c) a term
that penalises, or has the effect of penalising, one party (but not another party) for a breach or termination of the
contract; (d) a term that permits, or has the effect of permitting, one party (but not another party) to vary the
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that are expressly required or permitted by another law are excluded from the UCT provisions.38
The rationale for this exclusion under the ACL is that consumers who enter into a contract will
reasonably be expected to understand these particular terms on a basic level and make decisions
based upon them.39 There may also be some form of negotiation between the parties on these
matters. Ultimately it is argued by Coggins that ‘to assess whether it is unfair, a term must be
viewed in the context of the particular contract and the circumstances of its use’.40 Hence, the
contract, with its UCT, will be viewed as a whole in order to determine whether it is considered
void or not.
The effect of an unfair term in a consumer contract is that it is void.41 If a court makes a
declaration that a term is unfair and a party subsequently seeks to apply or rely on the unfair
term, the court may make a range of orders including, but not limited to, varying the contracts
or arrangements; refusing to enforce any or all of the terms of the contract; or directing the
person to refund money or property to the injured person.42 Therefore, the parties may still be
bound to the contract if the contract is able to continue without the unfair term. This is further
clarified by Murdoch and Zhang who state that:43
There are no immediate consequences for a party advantaged by an unfair term. That
is, it is not a breach of the ACL to include an unfair term in a contract. Rather, it is up
to the party disadvantaged to point out that the unfair term is void and pursue a claim
for damages or a court injunction if the advantaged party attempts to enforce the term.

However, as mentioned above, the UCT laws did not apply to a contract for the supply of goods
or services between businesses prior to 2015. With the increase in UCT on a commercial level,
the UCT regime under the ACL for small businesses formed some discussion on the introduction
of these provisions on a business-to-business level. The subsequent part will provide a
discussion on the UCT regime, as highlighted above, on small businesses. Notwithstanding the
standard contract theory of ‘freedom to contract’, this part will argue that the recently adopted
UCT regime, subject to the promotion by the ACCC and the awareness of the provisions by

terms of the contract; (e) a term that permits, or has the effect of permitting, one party (but not another party) to
renew or not renew the contract.’
38
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Australian Treasury, ‘Review of Unfair Contract Term Protections for Small Business’ (November 2018) 2-4
<https://consult.treasury.gov.au/market-and-competition-policy-division-internal/c2018t342379/supporting_documents/Discussion_Paper__Review_of_UCTs%20%20Final.pdf>.
40
Coggins (n 24) 274.
41
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42
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Nicole Murdoch and Sandy Zhang, ‘A Commercial IP Perspective on the New UCT Protection under the
ACL’ (2017) 30(6) Australian Intellectual Property Law Bulletin 139, 139.
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small businesses should provide these small businesses within the construction industry with
the much-needed protection in relation to standard form contracts and hidden UCTs.
V SMALL BUSINESS CONTRACTS AND UCT REGIME UNDER THE ACL
In 2009, the Commonwealth Treasury noted that the UCT provisions under standard consumer
contracts should not only apply to ‘consumer contracts’ but be extended to business-to-business
transactions and stated:44
Standard-form contracts are used by parties irrespective of the legal status or nature of
the party to whom the contract is presented, and without any effective opportunity for
that party to negotiate the term. In such cases, it would be invidious to suggest that the
same term, which may be considered unfair in relation to a contract entered into by a
natural person, would not be similarly unfair in relation to a business, where neither of
them is in a position to negotiate the term.

As a result, the federal government passed the Treasury Legislation Amendment (Small
Business and UCT) Bill 2015 on 27 October 2015 to include small businesses as part of the
unfair contract term regime under the ACL provisions. In introducing the Bill, the Hon. Bruce
Billson MP (Minister for Small Business) stated:45
This legislation will extend the consumer unfair contract term protections to cover
standard form, small business consumer-like contracts that are valued below a
prescribed threshold… With today’s introduction of this legislation we have met each
of our small business election commitments…That is why I have been committed to
provide a ‘fair go’ for small business by extending the unfair contract protections
currently available to consumers to cover the small business sector.

The objectives of the amendments were further highlighted by Weston:46
…founded on the premise that small businesses, like consumers, are vulnerable to
unfair terms in standard form contracts due to their reduced bargaining power and
inability to absorb the costs or contract risks should they eventuate. Small businesses
may lack the resources to retain legal advice or representation to negotiate a standard
form contract or assist in managing damage should difficulties arise.

The Treasury, ‘Consultation on Draft UCT Provisions’ (11 May 2009)
<https://archive.treasury.gov.au/documents/1537/PDF/The_Australian_Consumer_Law_Consultation_Paper.pdf
> 8.
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Also see Elizabeth Spencer, ‘The Applicability of UCT Legislation to Franchise Contracts’ (2013) 37(1)
University of Western Australia Law Review 156, 159 where it was stated that ‘businesses are consumers, whose
confidence in efficiency, fairness and certainty are important to any economy’ and therefore is subjected to
similar protection under the unfair contract term regime as consumers.
46
Freya Weston, ‘Creating an Even Playing Feld: Extending Unfair Contract Term Protections to Small
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Consequently, the amended s 23(1) provision relating to standard form contracts between
businesses commenced on 12 November 2016. The new laws apply to any new or renewed
contract entered into on or after this date. If an existing contract was varied on or after 12
November 2016, the law also applied to the varied terms.47
As mentioned earlier, the unfair contract term provisions apply to standard form contracts, with
the amended version including small businesses. The amended s 23(1) of the ACL now
provides:
(1) A term of a consumer contract or small business contract is void if:
(a) the term is unfair; and
(b) the contract is a standard form contract. [emphasis added]

Based on this amended provision, one of the jurisdictional issues is that only ‘small businesses’
(with the exception of consumers) dealing with ‘standard form contracts’ fall within the new
ACL provisions. Where a contract is deemed to be a standard form small business contract, a
number of parties can apply to court for a declaration that a term in the contract is an unfair
term. These include the parties to the contract, the Australian Securities and Investment
Commission (ASIC), or the Australian Consumer and Competition Commission (ACCC). In
order to determine a cause of action under the provisions of the ACL, it is firstly necessary to
determine if the contract is a ‘small business standard form’ contract containing proscribed
‘unfair’ terms. In relation to the building and construction industry, the meaning of a ‘small
business’ is an important consideration as it is claimed that most businesses in this industry are
either sole traders or very small, employing less than 20 people.48
A What is a ‘Small Business’ Contract in Construction?
In general, s 23(4) of the ACL states that a contract will be a small business contract if:
(i) the contract is for a supply of goods or services, or a sale or grant of an interest in
land; and
(ii) at the time the contract is entered into, at least one party to the contract is a business

See, Peter Sise, ‘The Extension of Unfair Contract Term Provisions to Small Business Contracts: A Lack of
Clarity’ (2016) 23 Competition and Consumer Law Journal 217.
48
Australian Industry and Skills Committee, ‘IRC Construction’ (14 December 2018) (Webpage)
<https://nationalindustryinsights.aisc.net.au/industries/construction>.
47
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that employs fewer than 20 persons; and
(iii) either of the following applies:
(a) the upfront price payable under the contract does not exceed $100,000;
(b) the contract has a duration of more than 12 months and the upfront price
payable under the contract does not exceed $300,000.

An important consideration is thus the ambit of the term ‘small business’ within the construction
industry. This is central to understanding how the Act and unfair contract term provisions apply
to businesses as set out under the ACL. From s 23(4), there are two clear thresholds that need
to be met. The first relates to the restriction of employees within the small business. According
to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill, the 20-employee restriction was adopted, by the
Australian Bureau of Statistics and the ‘the headcount measure…has been found by the ABS
to provide a good proxy of small business’.49 The second monetary threshold was also an
important consideration and the comments made as part of the Bill on this requirement included
words to the effect of ‘By creating a threshold, the Bill places the onus on small businesses to
undertake due diligence for high-value transactions. The committee considers this the fairest
approach’.50
However, the draft consultation paper by the Australian Treasury suggested other options to
what would entail a ‘small business’ for the purposes of the unfair contract term regime. These
included the following which were subsequently adopted in the UCT legislation:51
(i) businesses falling outside the definition of public-listed companies;52
(ii) businesses negotiating contracts under a certain threshold;53
(iii) considering the annual turnover of the business;54 and
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50
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(iv) taking into account the employees within that business.55

A further important consideration is s 23(5) stating that ‘In calculating the number of
employees, each full-time, part time and casual employee constitutes one person. However, a
casual employee is not to be counted unless that person is employed on a regular and systemic
basis’.56 This is a valid consideration in relation to subcontractors and the type of set up within
such a business. From a 2016 survey undertaken by the Australian Small Business and Family
Enterprise Ombudsman, it was revealed that 61% of businesses in Australia consist of sole
traders (acting on an individual basis) in a commercial setting and 9% of small businesses
employing less than 19 employees.57
B What is a ‘Standard Form Contract’ in Construction Agreements?
Standard form contracts are typically used for the supply of goods and services to consumers
in many industries. These include, but are not limited to, telecommunications, finance, domestic
buildings, gyms, motor vehicles, travel and utilities.58 In terms of the burden of proof under the
unfair contract term provisions, if a party to a proceeding alleges that a contract is a standard
form contract, it is helpful to consider the general provisions of the UCT provisions in respect
of standard form contracts before considering the specific application of the ACL to specific
terms found in construction contracts.
The first reported ‘standard form contract’ case under the amended s 23 provision for business
purposes is Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v JJ Richards & Sons Pty Ltd59
where it was found that a standard form small business contract contained numerous UCT
clauses. Apart from the UCT clauses found in the standard form contract, the court observed
that the contract was a ‘densely packed page of small print terms and conditions’ that is not
transparent and in breach of s 24(2) of the ACL.60 Therefore, the element of ‘transparency’ is
an important consideration especially in the construction industry where standard contracts are

Ibid. See in general, Trish O’Sullivan, ‘The Definition of “Consumer” – Will the Real “Consumer” Please
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often drafted in legal jargon and provided to small businesses on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.61
It is further noted by Evans in his Report to the Minister for Commerce that all sections within
the construction industry should be made aware of their rights and obligations in relation to
UCTs under the ACL provisions.62
The term ‘standard form contract’ is used generically to describe the main forms of General
Conditions of Contract (GCOC) used in the construction industry. These fall within two groups.
The GCOC documents prepared by Standards Australia63 and those produced by a range of
professional organisations including the Property Council of Australia, The Master Builders
Association of Australia, the Australian Institute of Architects and the Housing Industry of
Australia. Whether the construction industry GCOC fall within the UCT regime will depend on
the provisions as set out in section 23(4).
In construction, AS2124-1992 and AS4000-1997 are designed for use on major building and
engineering projects where a ‘superintendent’ is engaged to administer the contract. The
superintendent may be an independent professional or a firm of consultants64 or an employee
of the principal. The contract price may be calculated as a lump sum or re-measurement
(schedule of rates/bill of quantities) or a combination of these. Though Standards Australia (SA)
intended to discontinue publication of the AS2124-1992 (which itself replaced the superseded
1978, 1981 and 1986 editions) when the AS4000 contract was released, AS2124 remains
available as a current Australian Standard (AS) and the anecdotal evidence suggests that it is
used in preference to AS4000.
The advantages of the use of standard form contracts in the Australian construction industry
have been well documented. As far back as 1990 it was stated:65
Standard forms of contract are preferred by the industry to contracts that are
individually drafted for each project, if for no other reason than that as both parties are
more likely to be fully familiar with the obligations assumed by each party using a
Standard form they will thereby reduce incidents of dispute caused by concealing
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obligations in unfamiliar documents.

More recently, the benefits of standard form contracts have been noted in the research report
by the Melbourne University School of Law.66 The report is extensive and detailed and states
in part that 68% of contracts are based upon AS standard form contracts and the dominating
factor identified by participants was the familiarity with the forms. Their widespread use over
time and familiarity enables participants to clearly understand the meaning of terms and their
rights and obligations under the contract. Additionally, the dispute resolution procedures used
in these standard forms are very effective with respect to quick and economical resolution of
disputes. The AS standard forms have been prepared after long consultation with relevant
stakeholders and interested parties and are subject to review and revision from time to time. A
significant benefit in their use is that the risk is ‘balanced’ between the contracting parties.
Unless subject to non-complying amendments or inclusions in the Special Conditions section,
the main provisions in the AS suite of GCOC would generally not fall within the UCT
provisions of the ACL with the exception of those terms discussed below. However, sections of
the construction industry are characterised as a consequence of the use of what might be
described as bespoke contracts67 usually prepared by the dominant contracting party. A number
of submissions to the Western Australian review of the operation and effectiveness of
Construction Contracts Act 200468 provided a number of examples of terms which would now
be prohibited under the provisions of the ACL. These fell within the definition of small business
contracts as the contracts involved were predominantly sole trader subcontracts satisfying the
criteria in section 27(4) of the UCT legislation.
Put simply, the above factors and those listed under s 27(2) of the ACL are indicative of an
agreement between two parties, where the terms and conditions of the contract are set by one
of the parties, and the other party (often the vulnerable party) has little or no ability to negotiate
more favourable terms and is thus placed in a ‘take it or leave it’ position.69
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C Defining ‘Unfair Terms’ in Construction Standard Form Contracts
In determining which terms of a construction contract might fall within the provisions of the
ACL the starting point is considering ss 24 and 25 of the ACL which define the meaning and
application of unfair terms within a standard form small business contract. There is a four -step
approach to identify whether a term is unfair within standard form construction contract.
1 Section 24(1)(a) of the ACL
The first limb of the test requires a consideration of whether there is an imbalance of the parties’
rights and obligations through the weighing of favorability. The requirement under this test is
for the imbalance to be so significant that it affects the substantive operation of the contract as
a whole.70 It should be emphasised that it is not the overall conduct of a party that renders the
contract unfair.71 It is whether the ‘term’ is unfair. In Ferme v Kimberley Discovery Cruises Pty
Ltd,72 Jarrett J explained that:
Section 24(1)(a) requires an inquiry into the balance “in the parties’ rights and
obligations arising under the contract”…As the applicant submits, the issue is “whether
a term of a contract is unfair, not whether the overall conduct of the Respondent is or
was unfair”. Section 24(1)(a) directs attention to the rights and obligations arising
under the contract. That is a matter for objective assessment according to those terms
properly construed. (emphasis added)

Although the common law makes provision for some default rules in relation to parties’ rights
and obligations, it is the significant tilting of the unfavourable impact of the unfair contract term
towards the disadvantaged party that will be taken into account.73 This is reiterated by Willett
stating that ‘The requirement of significant imbalance is met if a term is so weighted in favour
of the supplier as to tilt the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract significantly in his
favour’.74 In relation to construction contracts, ‘terms that set the upfront price payable are
generally excluded from the UCT legislation and may be one of the main ‘balance tilting’
criteria to consider under s 24(1)(a).75 The upfront price payable includes any payments to be
provided for the supply, sale or grant under the contract that are clearly disclosed at or before
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the time the contract is entered into. This includes any contingent payments which are
preferable to the supply, sale or grant under the contract which are disclosed at the time the
contract is entered into. For the purposes of determining whether a contract falls under the
relevant threshold ($300 000 or $1 million) to meet the definition of a ‘small business contract’,
any amounts that cannot be calculated with certainty at the time the contract is entered are
unlikely to be included in the calculation of the upfront price payable. In terms of construction
contracts there are a range of costs which cannot be determined at the time of entering into the
contract including variations, extras and costs associate with latent conditions.
A useful example relates to price variation clauses and how these clauses extend beyond what
is reasonably necessary. This may impact a small business and cause a significant imbalance of
their rights and obligations within a construction contract. Another example of how small
businesses may be where the ‘time clause’ is so weighted in favour of the bigger construction
contract party that it breaches s 24(1)(a). These examples will be further expanded on below.
2 Section 24(1)(b) of the ACL
For a small building and construction businesses to argue UCT under the ACL, it is important
to note that s 24(4) places an onus on the larger business or the person who would benefit from
the contract to prove that it is done as part of its legitimate interest. 76 In order to prove some
form of legitimate interest, Patterson remarks that:77
By showing that the term protects the trader from business risks inherent in the
transaction, as opposed to being an opportunistic attempt to appropriate gains not
contemplated as part of the original bargain.

Therefore, a term in a construction contract will not necessarily be unfair if it is to protect the
legitimate interest of the larger business. However, it is important to also prove that it is
‘reasonably necessary’ for the term to bring about a legitimate interest. In Abraham v Gogetta
Equipment Funding Pty Ltd,78 the tribunal held that:79
a term of a contract is not reasonably necessary in order to protect the legitimate
interests of the party who would be advantaged by the term, unless that party proves
otherwise. In other words, the onus is on the Respondent to prove to the Tribunal that
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this Term is necessary to protect is legitimate interests.

From this it is clear to suggest that the court will take into account ‘proportionality’ in order to
weigh up the imbalance between the parties.80 It has also been argued by Clarke and Erbacher
that s 24(1)(b) mirrors the factors in determining unconscionable conduct under s 22 of the
ACL.81
3 Section 24(1)(c) of the ACL
In order to bring a claim under the UCT regime, it is important to argue that the stronger or
more advantaged party to the contract caused ‘detriment’ to the interests of the weaker party.
However, this provision has been the centre of attention in that the ‘detriment’ caused does not
have to be financial in nature. In this respect, Harbison J held that:82
There does not seem to be much that can be said about the concept of the imbalance
being to the detriment of the consumer. The only matter to be flagged about those words
is that it is clearly an imbalance which is to the consumer’s detriment and not an
imbalance to the detriment of the trader, which is important in considering this
definition. [emphasis added]

This is confirmed by the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill which states that ‘Detriment is
not limited to financial detriment. This is designed to allow the Court to consider situations
where there may be other forms of detriment that have affected or may affect the party
disadvantaged by the practical effect of the term’.83
Therefore, in a construction contract scenario, considerations such as delay of work,
inconvenience and hardship may all be relevant to take into account as a form of ‘detriment’
under s 24(1)(c). This may be claimed as such by the small business.
4 Sections 24(2)-(3) of the ACL
Phillips comments that ‘the law affects only the “structure” of the contract, with the emphasis
on a “balance of power” under the contract’.84 A commercial agreement can become convoluted
in the interpretation of the terms in a standard form small business contract. As a result, apart
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from ss 24(1)(a)-(c), the court must also take into account the contract in its entirety as well as
the transparency of the particular term, allowing fairness in its application.85
This is an important consideration for the court because it has been noted that small businesses,
specifically independent contractors, do not read and/or understand a standard form contract
making the likelihood of unfair terms being present in the contract, more probable.86 Often, the
standard form contracts signed by small businesses within the construction and building
industry is drafted with difficult and tedious legal jargon which makes it susceptible to UCT
clauses.87 Hence, the court will be strictly interpreting s 24(3) taking into account the legal
jargon, plain language, legibility and whether the standard form contract was readily available
to the small business.88
Transparency considerations such as font size and the way in which the contract is presented to
the small business will be taken into account and in conjunction with the contract as a whole
under ss 24(2)-(3).89 Overall a general test for unfairness will be applied by the courts to
determine the impact of the UCT clauses between the construction contracting parties.90
Upon review of the application of s 24 in its totality, the case of Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission v Christco Hampers Australia Ltd91 provided a detailed stance as to the
application of the UCT provisions. Edelman J held that he agreed with senior counsel’s
submissions in relation to the construction of s 24 and held:92
(1) for a term to be unfair it must satisfy the requirements of all of s 24(1)(a) to (c);
(2) the onus is upon the applicant to prove the matters in ss 24(1)(a) and 24(1)(c) but it
is upon the respondent in relation to s 24(1)(b);
(3) Section 24(2)(a) only requires the Court to consider transparency in relation to the
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particular term that is said to be unfair and only in relation to the matters concerning
that term in s 24(1)(a) to (c);
(4) similarly, the assessment of the contract as a whole in s 24(1)(c) only requires the
Court to consider the contract as a whole in relation to the particular term that is said
to be unfair and only in relation to the matters concerning that term in s 24(1)(a) to (c);
(5) as the Explanatory Memorandum to the Trade Practices Amendment (Australian
Consumer Law) Bill (No 2) 2010 (Cth) provided at [5.39], “if a term is not transparent
it does not mean that it is unfair and if a term is transparent it does not mean that it is
not unfair”; and
(6) guidance can be had to s 25 which provides examples of unfair terms.

The principles outlined above, would apply equally to both consumer contracts and small
business contracts. The application of standard form small business contracts is central to the
construction industry. Therefore, it is worth identifying the types of clauses that may be caught
under s 24(1) that will affect a small business/subcontractor in the construction and building
industry.
VI UCT CLAUSES COMMONLY FOUND IN CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
Authority referred to such as Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v JJ Richards
set the landscape in that protection against UCTs in standard form contracts is warranted in the
case of small businesses. It is therefore vital to extend similar protections to small businesses
within the construction industry who often engage with standard form contracts and ‘hidden’
unfair terms. Whether a particular term in a construction contract is unfair will depend on the
circumstances surrounding the contract terms, including the context of the contract as a whole.93
However, as noted earlier, s 25 of the ACL provides a non-exhaustive list of terms the court
may take into account in order to obtain whether contract terms are considered ‘unfair’. While
the ACL protections have to date only been applied to a standard form construction contracts
containing a non-disparagement clause (discussed below) there are a number of terms besides
those listed under s 25, which are commonly found in construction contracts that may be caught
by the legislation.94
The terms are not discussed in any order of priority. They include:
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A Default, Insolvency and Termination for Convenience Clauses;
B Non-Disparagement Clauses;
C Interest on Overdue Payments;
D Extreme Time Bars;
E Unilateral Variation clauses;
F Unreasonable Prime Cost (PC) Items and Provisional Sums (PS);
G Latent Conditions Clauses; and
H Liquidated Damages Clauses (especially in the case of residential building work
which underestimate the owner’s loss due to delay).

A Default, Insolvency and Termination for Convenience Clauses
The normal default provisions in a contract permit the Principal to recover damages and
terminate the contract for breach of what are generally termed ‘substantial’ breaches of the
contract. Examples of substantial breaches are usually given in the contract, and in essence they
reflect the situations which would give rise to the innocent party to elect to terminate the
contract for breach of a condition falling within the common law principles. That is a breach
which would render performance of the contract something substantiality different from that
which was agreed to.95
However, an increase in the use of express termination or termination for convenience clauses
(TFC) or termination ‘at will’ clauses are frequently noted, which give the Principal or Owner
the right to unilaterally terminate a contract.96 These clauses were originally used in large
infrastructure or defence contracts to ensure that government is able to act freely in order to
vitiate contractual obligations where it is in the public interest, or where policy may change,
even though this may interfere with the normal common law contractual rights of the other
party. They are now being used in a range of construction agreements. The wording is typically
as follows:
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Without prejudice to any of the Principal’s other rights and powers under this contract,
the Principal may at any time for any reason within its sole discretion upon 10 Business
Days’ Notice to the Contractor terminate the Contract. Upon receipt of such notice the
Contractor shall remove its Constructional Plant from the Site, shall otherwise cease
the performance of its obligations under the Contract and shall endeavour to mitigate
any expense or losses that it or the Subcontractor may incur or has incurred in relation
to its obligations under the Contract.

Prior to the introduction of the ACL UCT provisions, courts have upheld the enforceability of
TFC provisions.97 Where the principal has discretion, whether or not to terminate the contract,
if the termination clause provides it with an absolute and uncontrolled discretion which it is
entitled to exercise for any reason it might deem advisable, that right will be unfettered.
Particularly if it has been brought to the contractor’s attention or was subject to discussion at
the time of entering into the contract.
In Thiess Contractors v Placer (Granny Smith) Pty Ltd98 Thiess unsuccessfully argued that a
TFC clause was unenforceable and was inconsistent with Placer’s good faith obligations. The
court held that Thiess was well aware of the risks of agreeing to the contract with the termination
clause in it and accepted those risks.99 However s 25(b) of the ACL identifies as potentially
unfair, a term permitting one party (but not the other) to terminate a contract. This significant
imbalance and disadvantage cause a potential risk in the context of standard form contracts with
small business where the principal’s legitimate interests are not proportionate.
It would appear that a TFC clause will be unfair if the process for termination is not mutual
(and it rarely is) and does not provide that the Contractor is to be compensated for its losses
including loss of profit and an overheads contribution on the balance of the work. If this is
absent then there is also the possibility that this clause may be considered as penal or depending
on the facts, as unconscionable.100
Whilst not relating to a construction contract, but nevertheless illustrative of the principles, the
ACCC in a review of selected industries with respect to unfair terms, considered two standard
form publishing contracts.101 They contained terms that allowed the publisher to terminate for

97

Theiss Contractors Pty Ltd v Placer (Granny Smith) Pty Ltd [2002] WASCA 102; Starlink International
Group Pty Ltd v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1154.
98
[2002] WASCA 102.
99
Ibid [19].
100
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2 ss 20-22.
101
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Unfair Terms in Small Business Contracts: A Review of
Selected Industries (ACCC Report, 9 November 2016)
23

‘any breach of the contract’. In response to action by the ACCC, one publisher was required to
amend its standard form contract to provide that it can now only terminate the agreement for a
‘material’ breach. Whilst the second publisher explained the circumstances in which it felt it
should be able to terminate the contract, it failed to justify why it was reasonably necessary to
be able to terminate for ‘any possible breach’ accordingly tilting the balance of the rights and
obligations between parties. The ACCC considered that broad, unrestrained terms were likely
to be unfair in accordance with the ACL.102 This application may be similarly applied to small
businesses contracting in the construction industry.
B Non-Disparagement Clauses
During 2017 and 2018, the ACCC commenced actions against two building companies in
connection with non-disparagement clauses,103 101 Residential Pty Ltd (101 Residential) and
Wisdom Properties Group Pty Ltd (Wisdom Homes). In the case of 101 Residential, a Perth
(WA) based building company used a building contract containing non-disparagement clauses
that prohibited customers from publishing any unapproved information about the company,
including online reviews.104 These were held by the ACCC to be unfair and in December 2017
101 Residential was required to remove the non-disparagement clauses and compensate clients
and provide a court undertaking that it would not prevent customers from publishing general
feedback relating to Residential.105 101 Residential also included in an annexure to its building
contract an exclusion of liability clause which sought to exclude the company from any liability
for damages or compensation for distress or inconvenience,106 any loss of profit, loss of use or
any indirect or consequential loss. These clauses were held to be inconsistent with the statutory
guarantees automatically provided to consumers under the ACL. Further they were likely to
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amount to a false or misleading representation concerning the existence, exclusion or effect of
any right or remedy in breach of s 29(1)(m) of the ACL.
The second non-disparagement action by the ACCC occurred in 2018 as a result of the use by
Wisdom Properties Group Pty Ltd (Wisdom Homes) over the period 2008 to 2018 of a term in
its agreement that prevented its clients from making any statements about the agreement or
services provided without the written consent of Wisdom Homes.107 If the client breached the
non-disparagement clauses, a term of the agreement also allowed Wisdom Homes to suspend
the building works. The ACCC accepted a court enforceable undertaking in June 2018 in which
Wisdom Homes agreed the terms were unfair and would not enforce the clauses or use similar
clauses in its agreements.108
It is important to note that there were no court proceedings against either 101 Residential or
Wisdom Homes and consequently no determination by a court that the non-disparagement
clauses were indeed ‘unfair’ in accordance with the ACL even though both companies agreed
the terms were unfair. However, it would appear that a court would strike out the nondisparagement terms in accordance with ss 24(1)(a)-(c) of the ACL in conjunction with ss
24(2)-(3).
Nevertheless, the actions by the ACCC have clearly placed builders on notice that the use of
these terms will attract the attention of the ACCC.
C Interest on Overdue Payments
Construction contracts normally contain an express term specifying a rate of interest if any
moneys due to a party are unpaid after the date on which they should have been paid. Clause
42.9 of AS2124-1992 and clause 37.5 of AS4000-1997 states that if no interest rate is stated in
the contract, then the rate of interest shall be 18%.109 At first sight it would appear that this
interest rate is usurious or perhaps penal and would be struck down. It had been proposed, that
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the two existing Standards were to be merged into a single Standard, AS11000:2015 (AS11000)
to supersede AS4000 and AS2124. In AS 11000 the interest rate under the contract, unless
otherwise specified, would be 12% lower than the 18% currently provided for in AS4000 and
AS2124.110 In contracts other than the AS general conditions of contract, it would appear that
where a nominated rate of interest has been struck out, or perhaps silent, it would be held that
the parties intended interest to be paid in the prescribed circumstances at a reasonable rate.111
However, it is considered that an interest rate of 18%, would fall within the prohibitions of ss
24(1)(b) and (c). Therefore, the courts may take into account the legitimate interests of the party
who would be advantaged balanced against the detriment it causes.
D Extreme Time Bars
All construction contracts will contain provisions requiring the builder or contractor to
notify the owner or superintendent of cause of delay. These times will be strictly applied
and can result in the loss of a party’s rights if certain requirements are not met within a
stipulated time. 112 That is, the right will be time barred.
The typical clause will be in a form as follows:
If the Contractor does not provide the Superintendent, within the requirements of the
contract, any claim or notice within 14 days of the Contractor becoming aware of the
circumstances giving rise to the claim or notice, the Contractor shall not be entitled to
the claim or to any claim whatsoever arising from those circumstances.

Courts will strictly enforce time bar provisions with respect to extension of time variation
claims.113 However, the principal as superintendent is obliged to act honestly and impartially in
deciding to enforce a time bar provision.114 The reasoning is that in a typical contractual chain
each party will have a reciprocal obligation to notify the party above it of an event that is likely
to delay the progress of works or cause those works to cost more money. Unless such notice is
given in a timely manner at each point in the contractual chain, the owner or principal may
incur losses, as a consequence of failure to comply with its own contractual obligations and
additionally a superintendent will require time to assess the basis of the claim.
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However, a time bar could deprive a builder or contractor for a legitimate payment or an
extension of time to complete the works if required notices, and information, are not given
within the times specified in the contract. A clause that requires extensive information to be
given, in writing, within an exceptionally short timeframe, could be deemed to be unfair and
the court will now be likely to consider if the actual time bars specified are reasonably set
having regard to the criteria set out within ss 24(1)(a)-(c) of the ACL and obligations of those
parties who attempt to invoke the time bar clauses.
E Variations to the Work
The power to unilaterally vary the characteristics of the goods or services to be supplied is listed
in s 25(d) of the ACL as an example of a term in a standard form contract that is unfair. In the
construction industry context, this relates to the power to vary the scope of works or services to
be supplied. A variation can arise after the commencement of the works at the initiative of either
party, or from circumstances beyond the control of both parties such as latent conditions or
changes in legislative requirements. As an example, clause 40.1 of AS 2124-1992 describes
variations as being directions given by the superintendent to:115
(i) Increase, decrease or omit any part of the work under the contract;
(ii) Change the character or quality of any material of work;
(iii) Chance the levels, lines, positions or dimensions of any part of the work under the
contract;
(iv) Execute additional work; or
(v) Demolish or remove material or work no longer required by the principal.

However, the ability to order a variation is not unfettered and any variations ordered must fall
within the scope of the works.116 It has long been held at common law that the principal or
superintendent does not have the right to instruct variations and unless the contract expressly
permits the principal or superintendent to order variations, the contractor can refuse to perform
the variation.117
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The AS General Conditions of Contract variation clauses are extensive and equitable in terms
of protecting contractors where variations are ordered by the superintendent. That is the
variation clause provides the contractor with the opportunity to confirm whether the proposed
variation can be affected, and if so, to provide a proposal for details relating to cost and time
for performance. 118 Conversely, where a contract provides for the principal or superintendent
to direct a variation before there is agreement with respect to scope, price and time, there is the
risk that the term will be unfair119 if it requires the contractor to comply, with the terms (possibly
detrimental) yet to be agreed or determined later. To avoid this the variation term should
expressly provide the builder or contractor with an opportunity to accept or reject the variation
and to confirm any time and cost consequences prior to proceeding with the variation.
F Prime Cost (PC) Items and Provisional Sums (PS)
Prime Cost (PC) items and provisional sums (PS) are two of the items in a standard building
contract which can give rise to unfairness as a consequence of inflated estimated costs prepared
by the builder or contractor. Even though a contract may be described as ‘lump sum’ or ‘fixed
cost’ the final sum will vary (usually by way of increase) as a consequence of the actual or final
cost of the PC and PS items.120 The two items are different. A PC item is an amount of money
included in a contract sum to purchase specified item such as floor covering, ceramic tiles,
kitchen and bathroom fittings.121 The nature and type of these items is known to the parties who
will agree to an estimated amount which is expressly included (usually in a contract annexure)
in contract. The items will be selected by the client prior to construction and any difference in
the price as stated in the contract and at the time of completion will be adjusted by way of an
increase or deduction in the lump sum price.
On the other hand, a PS is an amount of money expressed in the contract to cover any work and
materials, the nature, extent and price of cannot be quantified at the time of entering into the
contract.122 Typically these will include site works, foundation conditions, provision of septic
tanks and ancillary plumbing and drainage, or in additions and extensions where the adequacy
of structural support is unknown. Like PC items where the estimated cost differs from the actual
cost incurred in completing the construction, the final amount will be adjusted to reflect the
118
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actual cost. There is currently some legislative protection to owners under the Home Building
Contracts Act 1991 (WA) which stipulates that a builder must estimate the cost of such items
at or above the lowest amount these items could reasonably cost, which must not be
understated.123 Section 12(1) specifically states that:
A builder must not enter into a contract that contains an amount or an estimated
amount for a prime cost item or a provisional sum if the amount or estimated
amount is misstated by being less than the least amount that it could reasonably
cost to supply the item or perform the work to which the amount relates. (emphasis
added)

From this, it is evident to state that the reference to ‘reasonable cost’ is problematic. The
contract will generally state that the owner is not permitted to supply or arrange PC items which
must be supplied by the builder and there is no opportunity to negotiate this provision.
Additionally, anecdotal evidence suggests that builders will typically cost these items well
above the cost at which an owner could independently obtain these items and where supporting
documentation is supplied in support of the cost there is no opportunity to independently
confirm the validity of these costs. These types of clauses lend themselves to small businesses
and Contractors being protected under the s24 UCT provisions.
G Latent Conditions Clauses
The term latent condition is usually considered in relation to sub-soil conditions but may refer
generally to items which are dormant, hidden or concealed.124 The items are not exclusive but
can include hazardous or toxic materials, groundwater, utility services and more usually
differing foundation materials.125 For example, the latent condition may consist of rock of a
different composition to that shown in pre contractual geotechnical investigations. Therefore,
latent conditions are confined to physical conditions.126 They do not include shortages of labour
or inflation. Frequently they are defined to exclude weather conditions and the water table level.
The term may be defined differently in various contracts and it can include any physical
condition on or about the site which the contractor could not reasonably have anticipated or
identified at the time of tendering or prior to the commencement of the works under the
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contract.127 The term should not be confused with the term latent defects which refers to defects
that exist in the work that cannot be ascertained or identified by making reasonable enquiries
or conducting reasonable investigations at the time of practical completion. With respect to the
typical GCOC AS2124-1992 (clause 12), AS4000-1997 (Clause 25) and AS4300-1995 (Design
and Construct), each contain similar definitions of latent conditions that may lead to UCT under
s 24(1)(a)-(c).128
By way of example, AS2124-1992 (clause 12.1) defines latent conditions as physical conditions
on or under the site or its surroundings which differ materially from the physical conditions
which should reasonably have been anticipated by the contractor at the time of tender, if the
contractor had examined all information made available by the principal, examined all
information relevant to the risks, contingencies and other circumstances that are obtainable by
reasonable inquiry and from inspection of the site and its surroundings.129 The latent condition
clause in these standard contracts has been reproduced in numerous construction contracts, for
example, the Australian Building Industry Contracts (ABIC) suite of contracts.130 The
Australian Standard clause is now the most well-known latent condition clause in Australia. It
provides the contractor with an entitlement to recompense for additional costs caused by a latent
condition whether or not the latent condition constitutes a variation.
The form of contract prepared by the Property Council of Australia which is used particularly
for non-residential building projects (PC-1 2000) has a latent conditions clause using similar
wording to AS2124 but also requires the principal or owner to provide a warranty to the
contractor that it has made all relevant information about the site available to the contractor.131
The PC-1 contract has been written specifically in order to protect the interests of building
owners and project financiers.
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The terms of standard form contracts and construction contracts generally govern which party
bears the risk for those latent conditions. The benefits arising from the use of the standard from
latent conditions clause is that it attempts to balance or allocate the risk equitably.132 Put another
way: which party who is best equipped by posseting the relevant site information or the greater
expertise and ability to principally bear the risk? Consequently, these terms would not be
considered unfair and would comply with the UCT terms provisions.133
However, there are some contracts which place the burden of the risk with respect to latent
conditions on the contractor and at common law, initially the courts gave very limited relief to
contractors when encountering delays or additional costs because of latent defects. In
Pakenham v Board of Land and Works,134 the Court stated:135
We think that the statement in the contract that ‘the contactor is to satisfy himself as to
the correctness of the levels and dimensions’ sufficiently indicate the intention of the
parties that each was to take his own risk of the accuracy or inaccuracy of the plans.

In the Australian jurisdiction, in Dillingham Constructions Pty Ltd v Downs136 it was stated that
‘a party who has contracted to carry out building work on or under land is duty bound to satisfy
themselves of the nature and characteristics of the land both on the surface and below it’.137
Additionally some contracts still require the contractor to bear the risk for any latent conditions
at the site as in Abigroup Contractors Pty Ltd v Sydney Catchment Authority (No 3).138If the
wording of the latent conditions clause in the contract prevents any additional cost caused by
the latent condition to be recouped as the cost of a variation, the contractor may have a strong
claim based on the UCT provisions in the ACL.139 These costs should be borne by the principal
on the basis that the latent condition arose due to the nature of their site and that they would
have more knowledge about their site than the contractor despite a contractor having a
reasonable opportunity to inspect the site.
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Prohibitions in a contract in these circumstance would cause a significant imbalance in the
parties’ rights and obligations under the contract and are not reasonably necessary to protect
the legitimate interest of a party to the contract and would cause detriment to a party to the
contract if it were to be applied or relied upon.140
H Liquidated Damages Clauses
The basis of a claim in contractual damages is that the innocent party is entitled to be
compensated for the losses which flow from the breach. At the same time the common law
recognises the rights of parties to freely agree at the time of entering into the contract to estimate
losses payable upon the breach without the need to prove the quantum of the loss. These clauses
(whether time or performance related) are triggered by a breach on the part of the contractor,
being a breach of an obligation either to complete the works by a nominated date or to a
guaranteed standard of performance. The obligations are expressed in what is generally known
as a liquidated damages (LD) clause.141 They are a common feature of construction law
contracts142 as both parties recognise the benefits in the use of an LD clause. In particular they
remove the need for the ‘innocent’ party to prove the actual quantum of the loss suffered,
encourage contract performance and provide certainty by allowing the parties to determine their
rights and liabilities regarding the loss following a breach of one or more of the terms of the
contract.143
To date courts have generally enforced LD clauses even if it results in an outcome that is unfair
to either party again on the basis that the parties have had to negotiate the term at the time of
entering into the contract and as discussed above will be bound by the term.144 Nevertheless,
the doctrine of contractual penalties will apply if terms result in the incurrence of an extravagant
and unconscionable amount, in the event of breach of contract by one party or inserted
in terrorem of the offending party.145
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In Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage and Motor Co Ltd146 Lord Dunedin set out
the four principles to be applied in determining the distinction between liquidated damages
and penalties:147
(i) If the sum is extravagant or unconscionable in comparison to the greatest loss
conceivable from the breach, it is a penalty; and
(ii) If the breach is the failure to pay money, and the sum is greater than the sum that
ought to have been paid, it is a penalty; and
(iii) If it is a single lump sum which is payable on the occurrence of one or multiple
events, some of which only warranting trifling damages, there is a presumption
that it is a penalty; and on the other hand
(iv) Because the consequences of the breach are very hard or maybe impossible to
estimate, it does not mean it is a penalty. Rather, there is a presumption that it is a
liquidated sum.

These four principles have been consistently applied in Australian authority,148 and have had
significant influence of the application of the doctrine of contractual penalties. However, the
application of these principles is nevertheless problematic as seen in the appeal from the
decision in State of Tasmania v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd (No 3).149 In a lengthy judgement
handed down in November 2004, the Supreme Court of Tasmania found that the amount
deducted as liquidated damages by the State was a penalty and had to be repaid to Leighton.150
The State’s appeal to the Full Court related solely to this finding arguing that the primary judge
erred in fact or in law in holding that the daily rate of $8,000 for liquidated damages agreed
between the State and Leighton constituted a penalty.
In 2005 the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Tasmania handed down its judgement in the
State of Tasmania v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd.151 The Full Court commented on the
subjectivity of the different terms used in various cases to characterise a liquidated damages
clause as a penalty, such as ‘extravagant’, ‘exorbitant’, ‘not a genuine pre-estimate’ and
‘unconscionable’ and noted that these words described differing conceptual approaches to the
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test of whether the stipulated amount was a penalty.152 The Full Court noted a number of matters
which should be taken into account in assessing whether the clause in question is a penalty and
analogous with UCT considerations the equivalence of bargaining power at the time of
agreement. 153
Put simply, as seen from both the first instance and appeal decisions, the current criteria with
respect to penalties are not definitive and are capable of various interpretations. The entrenched
position represented by Dunlop has now been further altered by the decision of the High Court
in Paciocco v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd.154 Following this decision
where there has been a breach of contact triggering the LD clause, a court must consider the
‘legitimate interests’ of the non-breaching party in performance of the contract. If trying to have
the LD sum set aside as a penalty, the breaching party must establish that the amount or other
performance obligation sought to be enforced by the non-breaching party, is extravagant or
unconscionable compared to the legitimate interests it protects.155
The majority held that the overarching test appropriate in the determination of whether the sum
stipulated is a penalty is whether such a sum is out of all proportion to the ‘interests of the party’
which it is the purpose of the provision to protect.156 These interests may be of a general
commercial nature. Relevantly the then Chief Justice French noted in Paciocco that the
penalties doctrine has been haphazardly developed and may benefit from statutory reform.157
The application of the UCT provisions to liquidated damages will be interesting in the context
that, previously, under the common law, provided they were not penalties, they were valid and
enforceable. This may no longer be the case.
Clearly there is significant subjectivity associated with the interpretation and application of the
essential terms such as ‘extravagant’, ‘exorbitant’, ‘not a genuine pre-estimate’ and
‘unconscionable’. Further the additional protection now provided to the party relying on the
clause as a consequence of the “legitimate interest test” together with the observation by the
former Chief Justice of the HCA strongly suggests that the law relating to penalties would
benefit from statutory reform. Consequently, an alternative to the application of the penalty
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doctrine with respect to LD is the application of the provisions in ss 24(1), 25 and 27(2) of the
ACL.
Alternatively, rather than focus on the Dunlop approach which concentrates on the validity
(albeit acknowledged as an estimate) of the stipulated sum it would be more equitable to focus
on the behaviour of the parties with respect to the insertion of the term as assessed against the
ACL UCT criteria.
VII CONCLUSION
There are difficulties in using the unconscionable provisions of the ACL to prevent the use of
unfair terms in consumer or small business standard form contracts. In part these include the
length of time and costs in applying the unconscionable conduct provisions in the ACL and also
actions under the unconscionable provisions of the ACL do not provide the court with the ability
to strike out UCT. Although there has been legislative change in relation to protection of small
businesses under the UCT provisions of the ACL, is still questionable whether there is sufficient
protection afforded to small businesses, especially in the construction industry.
With respect to the construction industry, the ACCC has identified in its 2019 Competition
Enforcement Approach and Objectives that its priorities involve focusing on (amongst other
areas), UCTs in the construction sector.158 In his annual CEDA address, ACCC Chair Rod Sims
launched the ACCCs 2019 Compliance and Enforcement Policy and stated in part:159
We will also be continuing our focus on the business-to-business unfair contract term
laws, particularly in the agricultural sector, but also in many others. UCT can cause
great harm to small businesses and farmers. The commercial construction sector will
also continue to be a focus area. We have a dedicated Commercial Construction Unit
looking at both competition and consumer issues in this sector. The work of the
Commercial Construction Unit includes supporting the current CDPP prosecution of
the CFMMEU, and we anticipate bringing further proceedings this year against other
parties. This sector faces many anti-competitive and unfair practices: more than most
other sectors. (Underlining by authors)

Currently, the inclusion of UCT clauses, whether in a consumer or small business standard form
contract, is not unlawful. Therefore, the ACCC is also advocating changes to the UCT law by
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way of prohibiting UCT in standard form contracts and introducing penalties for such an
inclusion and in turn strengthening the UCT laws significantly for small businesses. In this
respect, Mr Sims further announced that:160
First, we have already been advocating for reforms to the current unfair contract laws.
At present, it is only when a term is declared to be unfair by the Court that it becomes
void and unenforceable. The inclusion of unfair contract terms in contracts is not
prohibited and the ACCC is not able to seek penalties for this conduct. This provides a
number of challenges for an economy wide enforcement agency. Businesses have low
incentives to change their behaviour absent sanctions, knowing that if questioned, they
can quickly agree to change their contracts and move on…The point here is that
compliance with the law must be the responsibility of all firms; the ACCC’s role is
both in general education and in enforcement action to encourage this compliance. The
ACCC has argued that now is the time to prohibit unfair contract terms and impose
penalties for their inclusion in standard form contracts. The guidance given by the
ACCC since introduction of these laws in 2011 and recent ACCC court action should
enable all businesses to avoid including UCT in their standard form contracts.

The extent of a court’s power under the ACL to set aside or amend allegedly unfair provisions
in standard form construction contracts is still in its infancy. Whilst in some instances
conjectural, this paper has identified a number of common provisions in standard construction
contracts which could be considered unfair with respect to the UCT ACL provisions. Parties
who include unfair terms in standard form contracts face the risk of costly litigation (and
perhaps penalties in future) together with possible reputational damage if the court makes
findings that a party included unfair terms in its contract and/or the ACCC requires public
undertakings acknowledging the breach of the UCT provisions in the ACL.161
It is trite to say that ignorance of the law is no excuse. The information162 provided to the
construction industry by the ACCC since introduction of the UCT laws and recent ACCC
actions relating to non-disparagement clauses are clear warnings to avoid including UCTs in
standard form construction contracts particularly ad hoc or bespoke contracts.163
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